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In Markman claim term disputes, the paramount interest of the public in patents and in the public domain is
unrepresented, even though “patent rights are ‘issues of great moment to the public.’” What delineates the
outer bounds of the patent claim interpretation inquiry are the “private interests of the litigants.” The public
interest is set aside. Neither the courts nor the litigants are well positioned to address the “underlying policy of
the patent system” or to ask pointedly whether the patent claims, unless properly construed, have enough
“worth to the public” to “outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly.” The public interest in
how inventions are described in issued patents is a precise but flexible construct that confines the granted
rights within legal limits, disagrees with claims being read so expansively that information is taken back from
the public domain, and urges objective interpretations that favor neither litigants’ infringement nor invalidity
strategies. Amicus groups could define zones of interest when certain patent claims are interpreted and move
to represent the public interest in the Markman proceedings. A public interest advocacy group consisting of
law students who have completed a patent law course could be formed to identify cases that involve patent
claims that affect segments of commerce important to the public. Through an admitted attorney and local
counsel, such a group would enter an appearance for the limited purpose of participating as amicus in the
claim interpretation proceedings. This article argues first that amici could protect the public domain and
enforce the public notice function of patent claims. Then it argues in Section Three that having the litigants
restrict the range of interpretations a court may consider leaves the public interest aspects out of the decision-
making process. Next, Section Four of the article further contrasts the litigation-driven interpretations and the
objective rules of construction. The final section examines whether an amicus group representing the public
interest might be excluded from claim interpretation proceedings.
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I.   Introduction1
In Markman claim term disputes, the 
paramount interest of the public in patents and in the 
public domain is unrepresented, even though “patent 
rights are ‘issues of great moment to the public.’”2  
What delineates the outer bounds of the patent claim 
interpretation inquiry are the “private interests of the 
litigants.”3  The public interest is set aside.
Neither the courts nor the litigants are well 
positioned to address the “underlying policy of the 
patent system” or to ask pointedly whether the patent 
claims, unless properly construed, have enough “worth 
to the public” to “outweigh the restrictive effect of the 
limited patent monopoly.”4  The public interest in how 
inventions are described in issued patents is a precise 
but flexible construct that confines the granted rights 
within legal limits, disagrees with claims being read so 
expansively that information is taken back from the 
public domain, and urges objective interpretations 
that favor neither litigants’ infringement nor invalidity 
strategies.
Amicus groups could define zones of interest 
when certain patent claims are interpreted and move 
to represent the public interest in the Markman 
proceedings.  A public interest advocacy group 
consisting of law students who have completed a patent 
law course could be formed to identify cases that 
involve patent claims that affect segments of commerce 
important to the public.  Through an admitted 
attorney and local counsel, such a group would enter an 
appearance for the limited purpose of participating as 
amicus in the claim interpretation proceedings.
This article argues first that amici could protect 
the public domain and enforce the public notice 
function of patent claims.  Then it argues in Section 
Three that having the litigants restrict the range of 
interpretations a court may consider leaves the public 
interest aspects out of the decision-making process.  
Next, Section Four of the article further contrasts the 
1.  Patent attorney in private practice, and adjunct IP Professor 
teaching at the University of Kentucky College of Law.  I can be 
reached at c.leethomason@gmail[dot]com.
2.  Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 
324 U.S. 806, 815 (1944).
3.  Id.
4.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3258 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 
(1966)).
litigation-driven interpretations and the objective rules 
of construction.  The final section examines whether an 
amicus group representing the public interest might be 
excluded from claim interpretation proceedings.
II.   Seeking Public Notice and Guarding the 
Public Domain
The most fundamental policy behind the 
Patent Clause is enrichment of the public domain.5  
Neither a Court nor Congress can endow patents 
with rights that “remove existent knowledge from the 
public domain.”6  The quid pro quo for a patent grant 
is putting “the public in possession of” the invention 
described and claimed so that “the public is informed, 
not only of what has been patented, but of what still 
remains common as before.”7
 Starting with the Patent Act of 1793, every 
inventor and patent has been required to employ “such 
full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same 
from all other things before known.”8  
“Otherwise, a ‘zone of uncertainty 
which enterprise and experimentation 
may enter only at the risk of 
infringement claims would discourage 
invention only a little less than 
unequivocal foreclosure of the field,’ 
and ‘[t]he public [would] be deprived 
of rights supposed to belong to it, 
without being clearly told what it is 
that limits these rights.’”9  
Thus, clarity, notice, and preservation of the public 
5.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance 
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant 
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’.”).
6.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (noting that a patentable invention 
must “add to the sum of useful knowledge”).
7.  Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 413, 446 (1822).
8.  Patent Act of 1793, §3 Ch. 11, 21 Stat. 318, 321, set out 
in Evans, 20 U.S. at 380-81. 
9.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 
(1996) (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 
228, 236 (1942) and Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876).  
See also Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884) (“The public 
has the undoubted right to use, and it is to be presumed to us, what 
is not specifically claimed in the patent.”). 
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domain are public interest factors that deserve no 
less attention than is given to the litigation goals that 
parties have grounded on pliable passages in the patent 
application.10 
An amicus group could serve the public interest 
by advocating for patent claim interpretations that take 
nothing away from the public domain, do not capture 
the prior art, and do not expand patent claim scope 
through equivalence.11  Enforcing the requirements of 
public notice, describing and enabling the invention in 
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” and “particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming” the invention 
would ensure that the public interest is represented 
when patent claims are interpreted.12
III.   Litigants Establish the Perimeter Around 
the Interpretation Issues
In patent claim term disputes, the litigants 
select which claim limitations they will urge be 
interpreted and which terms will be strategically 
avoided.  Each litigant’s self-interest becomes the sole 
determinant for inclusion or exclusion of a claim 
limitation or term in the Markman presentations to the 
district judge.
Each litigant’s decisions about whether to 
battle over a particular claim term involve strategic 
interplay with which interpretations most likely 
will prove or avoid infringement or sustain validity 
or invalidity.  The strategic goal of the patentee is 
to dispute just enough of the claim terms to win 
on infringement without going so far as to risk 
invalidation.  An accused infringer may put all 
of its resources into invalidating the patent and 
almost none toward interpretations essential to non-
infringement of the claims.  Some defendants in patent 
infringement actions will urge that practically every 
claim term limitation be construed, while their motive 
is unconnected to pursuing an interpretation that is 
outcome determinative of any issue.13
10.   Proper claim interpretation will limit any patent that 
“withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly 
and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
11.  See Howe Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Needle Co., 134 U.S. 388, 394 
(1890) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (“The 
claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of 
making the patentee define precisely what his invention is, and it is 
unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it 
in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.”).
12.  35 U.S.C. §112 (2006); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. 
v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046 1052, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“The claims give notice . . . to the public at large, including 
potential competitors, after the patent has issued.”).
13.  See Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven 
C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and 
Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711, 731 (2010) (“It 
Once the litigants have set the bounds for 
their claims interpretation dispute, all the other claims 
and limitations are ignored.  In districts with local 
patent rules, only those “asserted” claims designated 
by the parties will be construed.14  “[O]nly those terms 
need be construed that are in controversy, and only to 
the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”15  An 
amicus group that urges a widened inquiry into the 
patent claims might be ruled out of bounds by the 
court or be deemed unwelcome by the litigants.  
The common concerns with participation 
by amici are an expansion of the issues framed by 
the litigants, a lack of stake in the actual controversy, 
and added work for the judiciary.  One can advocate 
that the overarching public interest in patent claims 
being construed fairly deserves more weight than the 
judicial efficiency perceived to result from the dispute 
being confined to those claim term arguments that the 
litigants prefer be considered.
“It is true that, in ordinary private 
litigation, courts sometimes confine 
their decisions narrowly, and, if one 
point is sufficient to support a decision, 
other points are not discussed.  Even 
if that could be said to be the usual 
practice, it loses much of its pertinence 
in patent cases.  A patent is a ‘public 
franchise,’ a legalized monopoly.  To 
allow a patent to remain apparently 
valid when the issue of invalidity 
is raised and the court sees that the 
patent is invalid, is to ignore the 
paramount public interest.  Because 
no representative of the public may 
institute a suit to have a patent held 
invalid, and because the courts have 
no staff of independent experts to aid 
them in patent suits, the courts must, 
in most cases, rely on the litigants….” 16
Rather than have district courts rely on the 
is all too common for the parties to propose differing construction 
but be unable to articulate why the differences matter.”).  See too, 
Comment to Northern District of Illinois Local Patent Rule 4.1, 
the “limitation to ten claim terms to be presented for construction 
is intended to require the parties to focus upon outcome-
determinative or otherwise significant disputes.”
14.  See, e.g., Local Patent Rules 4-3(c)2, N.D. Il. 
available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.
aspx?rtab=patentrules, Local Patent Rule 4.1, N.D. Cal, available at  
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/184/Local%20Rules%20
6.2.11%20with%20Cross%20Refs.pdf; infra note 43.
15.  Vivid Tech., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 
803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
16.  Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d 
Cir. 1942), (Frank, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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litigants exclusively in Markman proceedings, amicus 
groups could undertake the role of representing 
“the paramount public interest” in patents being 
construed properly.17  It is to be questioned whether 
the deliberative and litigious adversarial process can 
accommodate an amicus group to represent the public 
interest and advocate for the patent in suit to be 
interpreted more objectively.18 
The evaluative and objective process begins 
with the amicus group: (i) identifying ongoing patent 
suits with terms that, when interpreted, will affect 
some significant sector of commerce, innovation, or 
widespread public consumption, and (ii) appearing 
as amicus to aid in claim interpretation.  Once an 
appropriate Markman matter is identified, the amicus 
group must move, with or without the consent of 
the litigants, to appear in the case and brief the claim 
construction issues.
It is recognized in patent jurisprudence that 
the “public interest here is not in the fate of these 
litigants[;] . . . the interest is in the way this judge made 
law affects technologic innovation and competition.”19  
Even properly construed patents “serve as a barrier 
to competition for the type of subject matter that is 
patented.”20  The litigants’ dominant role and self-
interest in patent claim interpretation proceedings 
would be tempered if the public interest were urged as 
a worthy component of the Markman determination.  
In practice however, the litigants and the district court 
may prefer that a public interest advocacy group not be 
permitted to serve the role of amicus and present claim 
interpretation arguments.
17.  Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944).
18.  See Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 
F.3d 1246, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (“Unfortunately, the nature of our adversary 
system often causes those patents to be asserted against someone 
engaged in activity not contemplated by the inventors . . . and 
litigation counsel attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole, or, 
in other words, to fit into the claim language what the inventors 
never contemplated as part of their invention.”).  Amici have argued 
claim construction issues to the Federal Circuit, see e.g., Orion IP, 
LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“The court’s finding of nonobviousness is even more surprising in 
light of its construction of the claim term ‘a computerized method’.” 
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, 2009 WL1900190.
19.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 
F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).
20.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3257 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  
IV.   Evaluative, Objective Advocacy for the 
Public Interest in Patent Interpretation
Considerable dicta pronounces that patents 
and the scope of the exclusive patent rights enforceable 
by law are imbued with the “public interest.”21  Such 
pronouncements attach to patents that are invalid or 
unenforceable and against overbroad or unbounded 
patent claims.22  Yet, that “public interest” is of no 
interest to an accused infringer, and is of minimal 
concern to a patentee seeking to enforce its rights 
against infringement.23 
While the representation of the public 
interest in patent litigation is still actively debated, the 
discussion ultimately leads to specific case examples, 
infra.  However, it is not the purpose of this writer to 
critique specific patents, litigants, or strategies.  With 
due respect for the exceptional work of litigating 
patent attorneys and those district courts where most 
of the cases are venued, some examples are offered for 
discussion.
Consider cases where the same claim terms 
were construed more than once and differently by 
different judges.  Might objective advocacy from an 
amicus group representing the public interest have 
assisted in achieving a more efficient and correct 
result?  Many courts have construed the claim terms 
“database” or “memory” device, albeit in the context of 
various patents.24  The results of the separate Markman 
21.  Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 
U.S. 313, 344 (1971) (“The patent is a privilege . . .  which is 
conditioned by a public purpose . . . [and] results from invention 
and is limited to the invention which it defines.”); Lear, Inc. 
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (holding that there is an 
“important public interest in permitting full and free competition in 
the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.”); 
Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405 n.31 (C.C.P.A. 1969) 
(stating that during prosecution an applicant “may then amend his 
claims” to make it less likely a patentee will argue the claims should 
be “interpreted as giving broader coverage than is justified,” because 
“[t]his thought, in “the public interest, is deemed to be paramount 
to an applicant’s interest.”).
22.  See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. 324 U.S. 806; 
One recalls the claim of Samuel F.B. Morse to every “use of the 
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,” which was ruled 
invalid. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853).
23.  An exception being when a patentee seeks an injunction. 
See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 
865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“the standards of the public interest, not 
the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and 
need for injunctive relief in these cases”) (quoting Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)) (remanding case “for further 
proceedings to consider what this interest is”), cert. den’d, 469 U.S. 
856 (1984).
24.  Recent examples of Markman proceedings to construe 
“database” include Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 
C 09-05897 RS, 2011 WL 196884, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 
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rulings regarding those terms ended up at the Federal 
Circuit, which then a standard for review of conflicting 
constructions of the same claim term.25  
The Finisar appeal panel consulted two 
separate district courts’ interpretations of “information 
database” from the same patent.26  The Eastern District 
of Texas construed “information database” to mean 
“a collection of computerized information which can 
be accessed.”27  The Northern District of California 
construed it as “a dynamic, structured collection of 
digitized data capable of being held in computer 
storage.”28  Neither reading of “information database” 
by these courts was adopted on appeal, even though 
the same objective rules of claim interpretation were 
applied.  The Federal Circuit construed “information 
database” as used in the patent to be “a collection of 
computerized information which can be accessed and 
searched, and from which selected information can be 
retrieved, and where the search and retrieval capabilities 
are at least as specific as those of the hierarchically 
arranged set of indices.”29  
In all three proceedings the interpretations 
urged were a product of the litigants’ self-interest and, 
to an extent, how the “information database” was 
construed had an impact on the public domain.  The 
Eastern District of Texas’ definition is the broadest, and 
would capture most any database in the public domain. 
When the Federal Circuit found that access, search, 
and retrieval capabilities were defining limitations, 
the claimed information database was narrowed to 
correspond more to the specific invention, distinct from 
the broader domain of prior art databases.  Reading 
a claim term broadly tends to increase the likelihood 
that infringement can be proven, but at the risk that 
the broad definition also will read on invalidating prior 
art.  Litigants try to drive the Markman process into 
the definitional confines outlined by their commercial 
interests.  An amicus group that advocates the public 
interest would urge an objective reading of patent 
claims and that the definitional process be driven by 
2011), MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227 
(N.D. Cal. 2010), Civix-DDI v. Hotels.Com, No. 05 C 06869, 
2010 WL 4386475, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2010), and Jardin v. 
Datallegro, Inc., No. 08-CV-1462-IEG (RBB), 2010 WL 3910481, 
at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010).
25. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“In the interest of uniformity and correctness, this 
court consults the claim analysis of different district courts on the 
identical terms in the context of the same patent.”).
26.  See U.S. Patent No. 5,404,505 claim 16 (filed Nov. 1, 
1991).
27.  Finisar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
28.  Comcast Cable Commc’ns Corp. v. Finisar Corp., No. 
C 06-04206 WHA, 2007 WL 1052821, at *6 (N.D. Cal. April 6, 
2007).
29.  Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1331.
clarity, conformity with the disclosure in the public 
record, and protection of the public domain. 
In selected cases, amici representing the public 
interest could offer a wholly objective construction of 
the claim terms based on the intrinsic record that gave 
notice to the public.30  The claims would be “construed 
objectively and without reference to the accused 
device.”31 An objective interpretation by public interest 
amici would be uninfluenced by whether it captures 
features in the accused device or in the prior art.  
Interpreting a claim to have greater breadth 
may take more away from the public domain, but that 
added breadth will also make the claim read on more 
prior art.32  The corollary is that broadly construed 
claim terms are more likely to be infringed.33  Indeed, 
adding breadth to claims will expand what might 
infringe by equivalence.34  This suggests that the public 
interest is antithetical to overbroad or invalid claims 
that may result in undeserved monopolies, and further 
that the public interest may tend to favor construing 
claims narrowly and interpreting art in the public 
domain broadly.35
The zones of interest to be represented by 
amici who advocate for the public interest would 
include adherence to the intrinsic evidence and 
30.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
373 (1996) (a “patent must describe the exact scope of an invention 
. . . to ‘secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] 
to apprise the public of what is still open to them.’”) (quoting 
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891)).
31.  Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 
803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
32.  In Finisar, the disclosure in the prior art was read broadly, 
which protected the available public domain of technology. 523 
F.3d at 1336 (“Thus, one of skill would interpret the passage 
broadly to present many varied options for each of the tiers under 
consideration.”).
33.  Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The jurisprudence of claim construction 
reflects the difficult balance between a patentee’s exhortation that 
courts should read the claims broadly and unlimited to the specific 
embodiments shown in the specification . . . [and in] counterpoint, 
an accused infringer often argues, as in this case, that if the claims 
are read sufficiently broadly as to reach the accused device, the 
claims also read on the prior art and are invalid.”).
34.  Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (the “jury found infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents . . . [and] because the jury found infringement under 
the trial court’s more restricted reading of the claims, this court need 
not remand for a[literal] infringement determination according to 
this court’s broader claim interpretation.”).
35.  Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 
U.S. 394, 401 (1947) (“[Court’s] solicitude for the interest of 
the public fostered by freedom from invalid patents . . . has been 
manifest by the line of decisions . . . .”);  Warner-Jenkinson Co., 
Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (“There 
can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied 
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions 
of the statutory claiming requirement.”).
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objective interpretation of claim limitations, without 
undue regard for the accused subject matter, but with 
an appropriate regard for relevant art in the public 
domain.  Review of the case law indicates how often 
the Circuit court changes the claim term definitions 
presented by litigants in district court Markman 
hearings.  On balance, public interest representation 
in Markman proceedings would aid district courts in 
reaching an objective result, with the claims of the 
patent defined more objectively and the process driven 
less by choices grounded upon the litigants’ commercial 
objectives.
V.   The Interests of the Public Will Not Be 
Invited in MarkMan Proceedings
 Amici could validate the “objective test” on 
which the rules for patent claim interpretation are 
grounded.36  The pursuit of uniformity in how claims 
are interpreted should accommodate the public 
interest in patents.  Indeed, the standards for claim 
construction redound to the public “notice” function 
and to how “persons of skill,” i.e., an informed public, 
would understand the claim terms and the prior 
art.37  Moreover, Markman spawned a formulaic set 
of rules intended to be applied objectively and to 
produce uniform results.38  The rules for patent claim 
interpretation and those for construing contract terms 
objectively share many tenets.39  However, all patents 
and few contracts implicate the public interest.  Amici 
are as able as the litigants and the courts to divine 
meaning from the art and specification and to apply 
well-established rules to interpret the claims.
 In Markman proceedings, amici could advocate 
for the rule of law, the intrinsic record, the public 
domain, and the public interest.40  
36.  Markman, v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986. 
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
37.  See generally, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appl. Corp., 304 
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The limits of a patent must be known for 
the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive 
genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of the patent 
will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”).
38.  “[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment 
of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of 
construction to the court.”  Markman, 517 U.S. 370at 390 (1996) 
(aff’g 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]he objective 
test [is] what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 
invention would have understood the term to mean.”).
39.  See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986 (“[T]he focus in construing 
disputed terms in claim language is not the subjective intent of 
the parties to the patent contract when they used a particular term 
[but] rather is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill 
in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the 
term to mean”); id. at 987 (“[T]he more appropriate analogy for 
interpreting patent claims is the statutory interpretation analogy.”).
40.  See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting Merrill v. 
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877) ([Absent clarity, t]he public 
“Historically, then, an amicus curiae is 
an impartial individual who suggests 
the interpretation and status of the law, 
gives information concerning it, and 
whose function is to advise in order 
that justice may be done, rather than to 
advocate a point of view so that a cause 
may be won by one party or another.”41
On Markman issues, amici can serve that 
historic role by representing the public interest 
impartially and without regard to whether one litigant’s 
strategy or another is served.
 Amici representing the public interest may 
urge that claims be interpreted in ways that favor 
neither litigant.  When the district court considers the 
arguments for interpreting claims one way or the other, 
amici can present an objective view more consonant 
with the rules of construction that the reviewing court 
will apply.  
 The litigants are expected to press for claim 
interpretations that embody the wording needed 
to win, or to not lose their case.  However, when a 
patentee and the accused infringer fail to get claims 
interpreted broadly enough to prove infringement or 
invalidity, the result is a wash-out.  That too may be an 
outcome that results from the advocacy of amici for the 
public interest.
 In practice, neither party may desire for amici 
to participate, and the court may decline to consider 
claim interpretation issues beyond those presented 
by the litigants.  Exclusion of amici representing the 
public interest might be based on limits in Article III 
to actual controversies between litigants, or on a theory 
that amici lack standing or that when amici are not 
excluded, they must not go beyond the issues framed 
by the litigants.  “Amici are allowed to participate . 
. . to assist the court in achieving a just resolution 
of issues raised by the parties [but not] to interject 
into a case issues which the litigants, whatever their 
reasons might be, have chosen to ignore.”42 Still, 
case management orders typically can accommodate 
complexities that may arise from the participation of 
amicus or nominal parties.43  Those tools, joined with 
[would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it . . . .”).
41.  Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 2d 418, 420 (N.D. Ill. 1982).  
42.  Lane v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st 
Cir. 1989); See also San Juan Cnty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d 
1163, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., concurring) (“The principal 
difference between party and amicus status is that only parties 
ordinarily have the right to raise new issues . . . .”).  The better view 
is that of Judge Frank.  Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp, 130 F.2d 
290, 293 (2nd Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring). 
43.  Review of local rules databases did not disclose district 
courts having rules governing the participation of amici in civil 
cases, and so, it is presumed that case management orders serve that 
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the typical timetables in Local Patent Rules, provide 
more than adequate means to permit amici to appear 
and represent the public interest.44
 The appropriate instance for amici to 
represent the public interest would not have the issue 
of infringement or validity turn upon how a single 
term in the claims was interpreted.  Instead, the 
preferable case would entail a broader examination of 
interrelated claim terms, some of which are commonly 
used in many patents, and a claimed invention that 
affects the public interest.  Examples may be cases 
that could affect access to the internet or to generic 
drugs, or cases regarding emerging, still-developing 
technologies.45  The public interest concerns regarding 
notice, possession of the invention, the public domain, 
and restrictions on further innovation are more readily 
identified by amici in such cases. 
VI.   Conclusion 
In conclusion, amici can serve a useful purpose 
in Markman claim interpretation proceedings by 
representing the public interest factors identified in 
numerous, important decisions about patents and in 
the policies that the Patent Clause should advance.  A 
patent, and are specifically its claims to a disclosed 
invention, grants exclusive rights as against the public.  
Invoking judicial power to ascertain the breadth or 
limits of patent claims is as much a public interest 
proceeding as a First Amendment case where prior 
restraints affect public speech.  The record supporting 
the patent is public, and the rules of claim construction 
work in service of the public’s understanding of which 
exclusive rights were granted and what knowledge 
remains in the public domain.  
 Fifteen years later, the Markman procedures are 
still works in progress.  An opportunity is presented for 
amicus groups to elevate the public interests in patents 
from mere dicta, and to advocate that public interest 
concerns with the fair interpretation of patent claims 
should be a decisional element worthy of consideration 
in Markman briefs and hearings.
purpose.
44.  Local district court rules and best practices permit the 
threshold claim terms to be interpreted earlier than those that may 
be non-dispositive.  See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.RLocal Rules 
4-3(c) (requiring parties to identify claim “terms whose construction 
will be most significant to the resolution of the case.”). 
45.  Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 438 (1822) (it([It] is enough, 
and the public interest is sufficiently guarded, if care be taken that it 
[the patent] shall not be extended to create a monopoly in any other 
machine, which may or may not be mentioned in the patent . . . .”). 
